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“The lack of money is the root of all evil,” so preached Reverend Ike, legendary radio evangelist who urged his listeners—more than 2 million each week in the 1970s—to send him money, for which they would be rewarded many times over, through the power of his return blessing. Rev. Ike urged them to flaunt their riches, to take pride in their ambition, to deny even the possibility of avarice. He surely would have been successful in Henry III’s France, where the concept of avarice as one of the Seven Deadly Sins silently drifted out of an elite moral discourse focused on the Ten Commandments.

Jotham Parson’s superb new book, *Making Money in Sixteenth-Century France,* takes us into the arcane world of early modern minting but situates the seemingly obscure discourses about coinage in a far more fundamental shift in the dialogue reshaping French culture, both in political and moral terms. Avarice remained a great danger in that discourse—contemporaries invariably blamed avarice and ambition for the civil wars—but became a secular threat to the commonwealth more than a moral failing (p. 80). Parsons’s evidence, I believe, helps us to locate a fundamental shift in the monarchy, carried out by the royal councilors behind the currency debates of the 1570s. The luxury of the forum format allows one to focus on a given aspect of the book in question: I will target the financial and political dimensions.

Parsons brings together a spectacular collection of sources, ranging from well-known writings by authors such as Jean Cherruyl de Malestroict, Jean Bodin, and Barthélemy Laffemas, to private memoranda composed by high-ranking royal officials such as Jean de Morvilliers and Pomponne de Bellièvre, to the town council registers of Lyon. Parsons rightly emphasizes the curious fact that those who succeeded Michel de l’Hospital as chancellor (or as *garde des sceaux*), including Morvilliers, René de Birague, and Bellièvre, were financial specialists. In fact, every chancellor or *garde des sceaux* who served between the appointment of Michel de l’Hospital (1559) and the death of Bellièvre (1606) was first a financial official.[1] The dominance of financial issues in the problem of governance of late Valois France mandated that the chief royal officials be men with expertise in the critical financial issues of the day. As Parsons demonstrates, the money supply ranked high on their list of priorities. Morvilliers, in the 1560s, and Bellièvre, in the 1570s, were both chief negotiators in regulated debts owed to German and (in Bellièvre’s case) Swiss mercenaries. Parsons rightly emphasizes the special difficulties posed by payments, in hard cash and sound coin, owed to foreign troops.[2]

Parsons makes a clear case in chapter three that the government shifted, as he puts it in a particularly judicious sub-title, from “police to policy” between the reigns of Henry II and Charles
IX. One element of this policy shift—the introduction of mechanized minting—would, in fact, transform French coinage, but only during the massive reminting of 1639-1642. The royal councilors did debate monetary policy, of which minting formed a part.

During the early Wars of Religion, the royal council had two key factions of administrators: De l’Hospital’s wing and the Morvilliers-l’Aubespine axis. This second group took permanent control of the central administration around 1570. Here, I would suggest that Parsons might have stated more explicitly one of his most compelling findings: the triumph of Morvilliers and company meant, in the long run, the triumph of the emerging concept of the state over the traditional French commonwealth, championed—in one of its versions—by de l’Hospital (pp. 179-186). Jurists in the eighteenth century would harken back to de l’Hospital and his defense of the “bien public” as they sought to rein in the monarchy of Louis XV.

From 1570 until the deaths of Villeroy (1617) and Brûlart de Sillery (1624), the policies enumerated by Morvilliers (and Bellièvre) in the mid-1570s would dominate the government’s thinking, aside from the interlude of Sully’s administration. Maximilien de Béthune, duke of Sully, Henry IV’s chief finance minister, did not belong to this clique, and his administration, although it enhanced the shift from commonwealth to state, had distinct fiscal policies, as Parsons amply documents in chapter four. The Morvilliers group had sought a fixed gold to silver ratio in all coins, a ban on foreign coins, and the abandonment of the livre tournois as a money of account (pp. 116-117). The famous Edict of 1577 embodied their principles.

Sully restored the livre tournois as a money of account in 1602 and accumulated a five-million-livre cash hoard in the Bastille. Parsons does not much discuss this hoard—and his presentation of the abortive edict of 1609 offers one of the rare lapses in clarity in the text—but it would seem to represent the state coming loose from its commonwealth moorings. The policymakers of the 1570s understood perfectly well that civil society needed the coinage to circulate: Parsons offers abundant citations in his third chapter of their concerns about the need to make sure the coins they minted did not fall out of circulation. Sully, thinking only of the state, deliberately removed a substantial portion of the kingdom’s specie from the circuits of civil society. Bellièvre, unlike Sully, had a classic humanist education, including a stint at Padua, and he retained some element of concern for the commonwealth itself.[3] Sully, a military man, thought of security first, a common enough opinion in the France of Henry IV, for obvious reasons.[4] The ultimate monarchical solution combined elements of the two programs: Sully’s 1602 edict, restoring a money of account and bringing the legal value of the écu into agreement with its actual market value, established the duality that lasted until the Revolution.

Parsons details the crucial role of bimetallism in the currency crisis of 1577 (pp. 122-127).[5] The traditional medieval ratio was 12 silver to 1 gold; in the late sixteenth century, in France, the ratio stood slightly lower, at about 11.7:1. Sully raised the ratio to 11.9:1 in 1602; it rose to 13.7:1 in 1614, when fiscal policy was in the hands of Bellièvre’s old cronies, Pierre Jeannin, Villeroy, and Brûlart, by then the chancellor.[6] The considerable difference between ratios among European countries meant that what we might call insider trading enabled merchant-bankers to make a fortune shifting silver and gold across national boundaries, as individual countries shifted their bimetallic ratios. Parsons shows that French policymakers were well aware of this practice and sought various means to end it, including a ban on foreign coinage (chapter 3). The technical
challenges of coins made by hammer, and the ease by which they could be (and were) clipped, exacerbated the problem. The government finally solved that technical problem in 1639-1642, when it reminted both gold and silver coinage using mechanical processes. These remintings brought French coins to the precise degree of fineness of alloy of their Spanish equivalents.[7]

Parsons presents the key monetary problem policymakers faced during the reign of Henry III: rampant inflation. The greatest cause of inflation, after 1560, was the massive influx of American silver, as Jean Bodin was among the first to point out. The dramatic rise in the supply of silver entailed a concomitant decline in its value relative to other commodities, including gold, and thus an inflation in the price of silver. How large a practical change did the Edict of 1577 create? The astonishing output of the mint at Rennes, over 8.6 million livres of silver in the 1580s, and, in conjunction with Nantes, over 25 million livres between 1551 and 1600 (almost all of it after 1570), dwarfed previous minting of silver anywhere in the kingdom. The 1578 Rennes output, 4.6 million livres, was more than double the amount of total coinage minted in any year between 1500 and 1577 (2 million livres, in 1550, of which 95% was cheap copper-silver billon alloy).[8] In the 1570s and 1580s, an overwhelming majority of the silver minting took place at Rennes and Nantes, that is to say, it involved re-minting Spanish coins. As Jean Meuvret pointed out long ago, in France silver moved from west to east, and in Parsons’s period much of it left France in the hands of foreign mercenaries and bankers.[9] Parsons does provide evidence of the currency zones in France, but much further research on that topic is in order, aside from Lower Normandy, for which we now have Jérôme Jambu’s remarkable study.[10]

Parsons tells us that in the mid-1570s, “the French developed a distaste for holding abstract livres and even actual French coins” (p. 137). Does the evidence of actual usage of coins bear out this observation, based on the public discourse, and governmental debates about coinage and monetary policy? Notarial archives bear out the sudden shift to foreign coins, brought on by the collapse of the livre at the start of Henry III’s reign. Nicolas de Bauffremont, grand prévôt of the king’s household, baron of Sennecye-le-Grand, near Chalon-sur-Saône, generously left us an extensive paper trail of his transactions and the cash used within them.

The transactions of this one family bear out Parsons’s observations about the currency chaos of the 1570s. They managed large transactions with French gold and silver coins until 1574. Even small transactions, of 50 livres or less, often involved a handful of écus au soleil. The trickle of Iberian coins in 1572 and 1574 turned into a flood by 1578. The 1582 installment brought a mixture of Portuguese gold coins and French silver ones. The massive French silver minting of the late 1570s and early 1580s seems to have driven French gold coins out of circulation, making payments for a large sum—like 2000 écus—logistically daunting. Just as Parsons suggests, however, the 1577 reform, once it took root, brought French coins—mainly silver—back into circulation. Jambu’s Norman evidence further bears out these trends.[11]

Parsons emphasizes other factors in the inflation: the costs of bimetallism (such as the greater cost of minting low-denomination silver coins and the confusion caused by the shifting silver to gold ratio) and population growth between 1470 and 1550 (pp. 2, 128-136). Contemporaries recognized the change. In 1561, the Parlement of Paris ridiculed the Edict of Orléans for its clause calling for a reduction of taxes to the level of Louis XII, precisely on the grounds that everyone knew prices had risen sharply since 1515, so that a similar nominal level of royal revenue would leave the king
unable to run his government. In the 1570s, the royal commissioner to the Estates of Normandy, Jacques de Bauquemare, First President of the Parlement of Normandy, demolished this “lovely and specious demand,” reminding his listeners that prices had risen “10 times” since Louis XII’s death. He denounced those who used this excuse to encourage “some alteration in their ancient fidelity and obedience due to His Majesty.” He warned them that encouraging taxpayers to forego contribution to the tailles owed to their “sovereign prince” was sedition, and would lead to the loss of their animals, goods, houses, and even loss of “the chastity of their wives and daughters, as such are ordinarily the unhappy effects of civil war.”[12]

Two years earlier, Bauquemare had taken particular umbrage at violations of the king’s Edict of 1577 on coinage and accounts, noting that no one questioned that it was the “monarch and sovereign prince” who had the sole right to mint money and to set its value.[13] That statement attacked a fundamental principle of commonwealth ideology (see below), and provides a clear context for Parsons’s insistence on the centrality of that 1577 reform and the often lukewarm response of local elites, concerned with its practical implementation (pp. 146-148). Bauquemare reveals both the increasingly statist tenor of the arguments of Henry III’s councilors and the willingness of some of the upper echelons of the Parlements to accept those arguments.

Three elements of Parsons’s book deserve further observation. First, local records, such as town deliberations and cahiers de doléances, have important information about coinage issues down on the ground. Parsons makes effective use of the Lyon municipal deliberations, with respect to the flood of foreign, small-denomination coins (and locally minted coins, from the League period) (pp. 155-165). Jambu’s evidence for the mint at Saint-Lô shows the same remarkable spike in billon produced there: a six-fold increase between 1590 and 1593 and a complete collapse once Henry IV re-established his rule.[14] Other local records show the extent to which the “sound money” issue permeated the cahiers of towns, bailiwicks, and provinces. The relevant articles invariably demanded a stable, sound currency.

Second, Parsons has a short section on Elizabeth I’s recoinage in England, but the intellectual connections were even stronger than he implies (pp. 148-152). Cambridge University has a fine webpage about sixteenth-century English currency, in which Jennifer Bishop cites English politicians saying virtually the same things French ones uttered. Consider this comment from the Lord and Council of Ireland, in 1542: “We do consider that the baseness [of the coinage] cawseth unyuersall darthe, encreaseth ydlenes, decayeth nobylitie (one of the pryncypall kayes of a common welthe) and bryngeth magistrates in contempt and hatred of the people.”[15] Here we have many of the points Parsons’s French writers made: the key role of money in social stability above all. As he puts it, “Renaissance Europeans thought of money as a technology of social relations … [t]hat is why money so easily became a model or a metaphor for so many aspects of social life” (p. 288). Far from being a sixteenth-century innovation, however, that thought had much older roots.

Third, this reference to the past brings me to the one caveat I would offer: I disagree with Parsons’s characterization of medieval tracts about coinage as “works of moral theology, not of political economy” (p. 117). The medieval texts certainly did use the language of morality, but so did their sixteenth-century successors. Parsons himself cites elite discourse about the moral effect of excessive display, for example in clothing (pp. 86-92). The local cahiers also contained complaints
about “superfluity of dress.” For example, the painters and glaziers of Troyes suggested in 1576 that “superfluity of clothing causes the ruin of many” and argued that all should dress according to their “estate without exceeding.”[16] The moral language, however, should not disguise the crux of the matter in the late medieval period as in the sixteenth century: the events of the 1350s revolved first and foremost around sound money, and the arguments made at that time by Nicole Oresme, in his treatise *De moneta* (1355-1356), had everything to do with practical politics and coinage, and little to do with scholastic critiques of the immorality of debasing coinage.[17]

Parsons writes of “Renaissance elites” that while “Christian morality and piety are by no means absent from the discourse of economic regulation,” these elites “turned more insistently to a set of concepts grounded in classical philosophy: money as a product of the development of social order beyond the household, at once a spur to blind acquisition and a technology of justice” (p. 62). Oresme and others, such as Jean Buridan, made the same arguments, drawn from similar sources, in the 1350s. Moreover, royal legislation, with respect to the technology of justice, emphasized precisely that purpose of sound coinage.

The French commonwealth, so dear to the political elite of the sixteenth century, thus began in the 1350s, and the issue that brought its rhetoric of the “bien de la chose publique” (good of the commonwealth or republic) to the forefront was precisely Oresme’s discussion of currency in *De moneta*.[18] Moreover, Oresme provided the basic French vocabulary for the commonwealth, in the glossary to his French translation of Aristotle’s *Politics* (1373), which invented roughly 100 new words, among them such staples as “aristocratic.” Oresme’s translation retained pride of place until the 1570s, that is, precisely the moment of the monetary focus of Parsons’s book, when Louis Le Roy (Regius) brought out a new version, drawn from the original Greek.[19]

Did Oresme and the others primarily think about sound money in moral terms? No. Philip VI’s 1346 renewal of the privileges of the mint workers claimed that the money was for the “common profit of all the people,” that “without money the world cannot be well governed,” and that without money it was not possible “to do just equality to each of what is his.”[20] Copycat ordinances by regional princes like the dukes of Burgundy or Brittany spread such ideas.[21] These sentiments sound precisely like the ones uttered in Ireland in 1542, or in French treatises about currency during the reign of Henry III. Parsons rightly emphasizes the role of sound currency in maintaining the social order, in the eyes of sixteenth-century French elites, but that principle had been enunciated since at least the middle of the fourteenth century. It was a core value of French commonwealth ideology.

Does it matter if we recognize the practical dimension of Oresme’s arguments? The currency reform of 1577 took place at a vital moment in the transition from the monarchical commonwealth in place since the days of Charles V to the monarchical state that would take its place under Henry IV. Oresme set forward one of the essential doctrines of commonwealth ideology, one that directly contradicted what Bauquemare would say in 1579. Oresme claimed that the stamp on a coin was merely the issuing authority’s attestation to the fineness of the alloy in the coin. For Oresme, the institution of fixed value coins was a matter of the community’s good (*pro bono communitatis*), and not of seigneurial profit. His argument found ready takers among French elites.[22] Money belonged to the community (*moneta sit communitatis*) and existed for the utility and good of the “civil community” and the “necessity” of the “rei publice.” In the Paris of 1356, this necessity was practical, quite as much as moral.
Parsons demonstrates that such sentiments did not enter into the discussions of Morvilliers, Béliveau, and their contemporaries; like Bauquemare, they assumed that the king had regalian rights over the currency. Indeed, for Jean Bodin, the right to mint coins was one of the indisputable marks of genuine sovereignty. Charles V, as king, certainly did not accept Oresme’s idea that coinage was a public rather than a royal right, but he did accept Oresme’s vocabulary tying coinage to the common good, and thus accepted his obligation, as head of the body politic, to preserve sound money for the good of all. Henry III specifically emphasized his personal, lifelong dedication to the common good to the deputies of the Estates General of 1588 in his preliminary private meetings with delegations. Sound money laid the foundation for the edifice of that common good.[23]

Reaching back to Oresme, in 1484, speaking to the Estates General, Jean de Rély tied the public good to sound money: “just as blood is the sustenance of the corporal body, so are the finances of the Kingdom the sustenance of the chose publique.”[24] Unsurprisingly, this basic metaphor pops up in Parsons’s narrative. The deputies to the meetings of the Estates General in 1560, 1561, and 1576 all knew the speech of Jean de Rély well, because it was one of the holy texts of the commonwealth tradition. In 1560-1561, Parisian printer Vincent Sertenas re-issued these texts, as background reading for the Estates General of December 1560 and the follow-up rump meeting at Pontoise in August 1561.[25] Sertenas had close ties to chancellor de l’Hospital, who represented the commonwealth tradition, as against the new, statist ideology emerging in the camp of Jean de Morvilliers, de l’Hospital’s bureaucratic nemesis.

For me, one of the most exciting elements of Parsons’s book is that it shows that this ancient debate in the French monarchical commonwealth—which went back to 1356—resolved itself in part with respect to the issue that created it, currency reform. French kings had regularly consulted assemblies of various kinds—often men selected precisely because of their expertise in the matter at hand—about currency and financial reform. Even Henry II did so, just before his death. An Estates General allowed the king to consult a broad range of local elites to hear the sentiments of his subjects, but it excluded the men most able to discuss finances. The financial officers even filed a petition to that effect in 1588, when they again had virtually no representation at the Estates General. The financial officers (rightly) claimed the Estates General singled them out for unfair criticism precisely because they were not present to defend themselves. Assemblies of Notables (1558, 1583, 1596, 1617, 1626), specifically did include financial experts, including several treasurers of France and presidents from the Cour des Aides and the Cour des Monnaies, as well as representatives of the Parlements and the Chambers of Accounts. With respect to finances and coinage—key topics in 1596—it made a lot more sense for Henry IV to summon an Assembly of Notables, rather than an Estates General.[26]

Taken together, therefore, Parsons’s two books present a remarkable synthesis of two of the key components of the “respublique françoys,” as they liked to call the monarchical commonwealth of the late fourteenth through the late sixteenth century. Just as multiple Gallicanisms were in play, so, too, were multiple visions of the commonwealth itself.[27] The parlementaires had their vision, which could be blended into the new monarchical state, whereas the commonwealth dear to the local judiciary and middling nobles who sat in the Estates General had no place in this emerging entity’s national political space. Jean de Morvilliers and his team laid the foundations
for an entity largely controlled by the nobility of state, drawn overwhelmingly from the world of Parisian jurists.[28]

In December 2015, as we read incessant commentaries about the conflict of security and liberty, the so-called experts invariably look back to Thomas Hobbes as the inspiration of the modern state. In France, they could not be more wrong: the modern French state, with its emphasis on security, on the “good of the state” as the government of the Bourbon monarchs would say, dates back, as Jotham Parsons’s detailed reconstruction of a state monetary policy originating in the 1570s makes clear, to the Wars of Religion and to the processes and ideas set in motion by Jean de Morvilliers, Pomponne de Belliévre, and their successors.

NOTES

[1] François II de Montholon, who briefly held the seals in 1588-1589, provides the only exception.


Henry III minted as much silver coinage at Rennes in 1587 as his successors minted there from 1606 to 1625 combined. Henry IV issued few gold coins; aside from the large minting (784,000 l.) in 1615, gold minting at Paris, virtually never reached 50,000 l. in any given year between 1592 and 1625. Louis XIII reminted more than 55 million livres worth of gold coinage at Paris in 1640-1642. See, Spooner, *Frappes monétaires*, 394-395, 408-9.

In no year prior to 1550 for which Spooner has figures, did the French monarchy mint more than 479,000 livres in silver; the median annual value of minted silver between 1521 and 1550 was approximately 77,000 livres. All figures from relevant tables in Spooner, *Les frappes monétaires en France*. On Sully, Bernard and Ségole`ne Barbiche, *Sully. L’homme et ses fidèles* (Paris: Fayard 1997).


Jambu, *Tant d’or que d’argent*, chapter nine. Bauffremont family transactions found in: Archives départementales de la Saône-et-Loire (ADSL) 3 E 34,952, 3 E 35,516, and 3 E 35,517, registers of notary M`Claude Thévenot of Sennecey-le-Grand. For example, dowry payments provided in documents of 5 July 1574, 20 July 1574, 2 July 1578, 29 November 1582 (all in ADSL, 3 E 35,516).


De Robillard de Beaurepaire, *Cahiers des États de Normandie*, 277; «Les harangues prononcées par le président de Bauquemare, aux États de la province de Normandie, » Extract of *Précis des travaux de l’Académie des sciences belles-lettres et arts de Rouen*, 1871-1872, online: https://archive.org/stream/lesharanguespron00beau#page/n0/mode/2up.


Archives municipales de Troyes, BB 15, carton 1, liasse 3, contains 50 cahiers from Troyes and over 30 from surrounding castellanies.

Parsons only briefly discusses Oresme’s work and the important contribution of Theodore de Bèze, *De Asse* (Paris, 1515), more particularly of the summary French version, the *Épitomé du livre De Asse*, first published in 1522. When they spoke about coinage, French nobles, for

[18] One might note in passing that the first recognized meeting of the Estates General, called by Philip IV in 1303, dealt specifically with coinage. The Estates Generals of Languedoïl, meeting between October 1356 and 1358, focused heavily on sound money: discontent with debased coinage fed uprisings in Paris and other cities.


[22] The prince stamped the coins for the common utility (*utilitate commune*). The key passages are in chapters 5 and 6 of his *De moneta*. In chapter 7, he adds that “moneta igitur non est solius principus,” money does not belong to the prince alone. He cites Aristotle and Cicero as his authorities on this point. Parsons tells us that the Cour des Monnaies rarely cited any classical authority other than Aristotle (p. 68).

[23] The cahier of the Estates lifted this sentence verbatim from de Rély’s speech.

[24] Book projects I am completing on republicanism and the state in late medieval and early modern France will develop these subjects at greater length.


[26] Parsons attributes the use of an Assembly of Notables to Henry IV’s distaste for the Estates General (p. 166), but technical financial and monetary reforms were best treated, and traditionally discussed, in an Assembly, as in 1558 and 1583.


[28] Morvilliers, for a person of such considerable importance, has received very little attention. The old biography, one might even say hagiography, of Gustave Baguenault de Puchesse, *Jean de
Morvillier, évêque d'Orléans et garde des sceaux de France (Paris: Librairie Académique Didier, 1870; Geneva; Slatkine Reprints, 1977), contains useful information. He borrows heavily from the biography done by Morvilliers’s grand-nephew, Nicolas Lefèvre de Lezeau, “Vie de Jean de Morvillier, évêque d’Orléans” (BNF, Ms Fr 18,288). Lefèvre de Lezeau is far better known for his Vie de Michel de Marillac, and as a preceptor of Louis XIII.

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Volume 11, Issue 1. interviews confirm data collected by New York Times reporter Rukmini Callimachi. This article builds upon, and confirms, their reports with actual first-person interview material of ISIS insiders. Before the heavy onslaught of Russian and Coalition bombings in late 2015-2016, ISIS had no shortage of funds from the sale of oil, slaves, wheat stores and antiquities, bank robberies, and taxation/extortion of cash from those living inside its territory. Funding, up until recent military inroads on ISIS financing, has not been an issue for the Emni who appear to have had large sums of cash at their disposal.